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Abstract
This paper presents a model of a duo-centric linear city where agents
choose in which jurisdiction they want to work. Jurisdictions are unequally
productive and local governments use a head tax and, possibly, a source-
based wage tax, to finance a local public good. Each agent derives utility
from both the local public good of the jurisdiction where he works and where
he lives; thus, interjurisdictional commuting generates endogenous spillovers.
We analyze the tax competition equilibrium when local governments use both
the head and the wage tax and compare it to the utilitarian benchmark. We
show that local public goods are underprovided in the most productive ju-
risdiction, and overprovided in the least productive one. We also show that
distortive source-based wage taxation may improve upon the equilibrium
with residence taxes alone, as it allows to charge commuters with part of the
cost of the public good they enjoy.
Keywords: Tax competition, Commuting, Local Public Good Spillover,
Median Voter Equilibria.
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1 Introduction
In this paper we look at the impact of local level fiscal decentralization on
the provision of public goods in a framework where agents commute and
local governments provide public goods (or publicly provided private goods)
with an endogenous spillover effect. We have in mind the world described by
Fisher (1996) who writes “Many individuals live in one city, work in another,
and do most of their shopping at stores or a shopping mall in still another
locality”. The spillovers we want to analyze are due to the fact that agents
reside in one place but can work in a different one, and therefore can be
subject to two different local governments.
This framework encompasses a large variety of possible forms of local
governments, from different jurisdictions in one metropolitan area to neigh-
boring cities or even states with common borders as long as it makes sense
to have agents commuting from one to the other. As stated in Peralta (2007)
“there is extensive evidence of the increasing importance of interjurisdictional
commuting, possibly fostered by the improvement in transportation technolo-
gies”. Such increasing importance is documented for example in Shields and
Swenson (2000), Glaeser et al. (2001) and Renkow (2003) using US data,
by Van Ommeren et al. (1999) for The Netherlands or Cameron and Muell-
bauer (1998) for Great Britain. In all these papers we can find clear evidence
that both the number of commuters and the commuting distance has been
increasing in the last 40 or 50 years.
Since individuals spend most of their time in the place where they live and
where they work, it is natural to consider that they consume the public goods
provided in both. However, among the several types of local public goods
some are more used by the inhabitants of the municipality (such as garbage
collection, gas supply, parks or monuments with free entrance for locals, etc.),
while others are used by both the inhabitants and the commuters that work
there (road construction and maintenance, free parks, public transportation,
street lighting, etc.).1 Our purpose is precisely to find a way that better
1In this paper, when we refer to public good we are actually considering both public
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reflects these facts.
The literature usually treats spillovers as exogenous, i.e., agents “auto-
matically” get utility from the public goods provided in other jurisdictions.2
However, most local public goods are only consumed by the people who ac-
tually go to that municipality. If a nearby town now offers, for example, a
better garbage collection service, its residents will enjoy higher utility due to
cleaner streets, but it is difficult to argue that someone with little contact
with that city will benefit from that improved service.
In a commuting setup spillovers actually arise in a quite natural and
endogenous way: when individuals spend part of their working day away from
their residence jurisdiction, they enjoy public goods in both the municipality
where they live and in that where they work.
Local public goods are usually financed with a combination of local taxes
and transfers from central governments. Local governments worldwide have
different levels of tax collection autonomy, and access to different kinds of
taxes.3 Such taxes include residence-based wealth taxes, pure residence-based
income taxes, pure source-based income taxes, or “hybrid” ones.
Examples of residence-based wealth taxes are mostly residential and busi-
ness property taxes which, in the United States, “are the most important
source of local government tax revenue” (Braid, 2005). Pure residence-based
income taxes charged by local governments can be found in Baltimore (Braid,
2009) or in Portugal. Pure source-based wage taxes or payroll taxes that
apply uniformly to citizens depending only on their workplace can also be
found in the U.S., in cities like San Francisco, Los Angeles, Newark (New
Jersey) and Birmingham (Alabama), where “a central-city’s wage tax applies
at the same rate to central-city and suburban residents working in the central
city, but not to central-city and suburban residents working in the suburbs”
(Braid, 2009).
goods or publicly provided private goods.
2This is the Oates’s tradition spillover that we can find for example in Besley and Coate
(2003).
3For a thorough analysis of the fiscal autonomy of local governments please check the
OECD (2009) study.
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Examples of cities using “hybrid” income taxes are also presented in Braid
(2009). In these cases all central city residents are taxed at a rate, irrespective
of where they work, while residents in the suburbs who work in the central
city can be taxed at a different rate. Kansas City, St. Louis, Wilmington,
Detroit, New York City and Philadelphia are the provided examples. But
the use of wage or income taxes by local governments is not confined to
the United States. Mexico, Australia, Austria, France and Greece also have
payroll taxes at state or local level (Peralta, 2007). Korea has source based
income taxes (Chu and Norregaard, 1997). Besides these, Braid (2005) points
the use of such taxes also on Sweden, Denmark, France, Germany, Japan and
Spain.
When we think about the fiscal autonomy of local governments the prob-
lem of centralized vs. decentralized decision immediately arises. We traveled
a long way since the pioneering work of Oates (1972) who formalized the
standard approach for this question and reached the Oates’s Decentraliza-
tion Theorem that states that decentralization is preferred in the absence
of spillover effects while otherwise there is a trade-off due to the incapabil-
ity of the central government to follow different public policies in different
regions. This assumption of uniformity of the centralized policy is used in
many other papers on fiscal federalism to impose a cost on centralization.4
The arguments in favor of local governments are usually justified by some
kind of informational advantage on the features of their regions (they are
“closer to the people”, which allows to better respond to the agents’ needs)
but the decentralization comes to a cost due to the failure to internalize tax
and expenditure spillover effects (Oates, 1999).
Our purpose is to analyze the majority voting decentralized equilibrium
against the benchmark of a first-best benevolent social planner solution.5
Our model introduces public goods with an endogenous spillover effect
4For example in Alesina and Spolaore (1997) when studying the size of nations or in
Bolton and Roland (1997) analysing the threat of secession.
5The use of such equilibrium in tax competition scenarios can also be found in Fuest and
Hubber (2001) and Grazzini and van Ypersele (2003) who show that centralized decision
regarding capital taxes can make the median voter worse off.
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in the framework of a linear city used by, e.g., Peralta (2007) and Braid
(2000) to tackle interjurisdictional tax spillovers. The city is divided into two
jurisdictions and agents choose where they want to work. Productivity, and
thus wages, differ across regions and individuals trade-off the advantages (i.e.,
wage and working conditions) of a given job against travel costs (distance,
time, and money) when choosing their work place. Our main contribution
is to allow individuals to enjoy public goods in the work place. We do not,
however, model the residence choice of agents, assuming that residence and
working choices are independent, as argued by Wildasin (1986) and supported
by empirical evidence provided by Rouwendal and Meijer (2001), Glaeser et
al. (2001) and Zax (1991 and 1994). For a recent analysis of the residence
decision refer to Wrede (2009) where land is included and agents can choose
their residence location according to a bid-rent function.6
The contribution of this paper is twofold. On the one hand, it introduces
public good spillovers in a linear city tax competition model with commuting
in the line of Peralta (2007). On the other hand, it introduces a distortive
wage tax on a model with spillovers.
In our setup agents only get utility from the public good supplied in
the other jurisdiction if they choose to work there. Otherwise they only
get utility from the one provided in their own jurisdiction. Therefore, the
spillover effect is endogenous instead of the traditional exogenous one. One
may argue that agents enjoy the public goods in other jurisdictions if they go
there for leisure or shopping and therefore use the public goods provided even
without working there. However, such use is occasional and most of the goods
and services from which individual get utility in those cases are privately
provided ones (hotels, restaurants, leisure facilities, shopping malls, theaters,
etc.). As such, we chose to disregard these situations and concentrate on the
commuters for work case.
We prove that in the tax competition equilibrium the public good of the
most productive region is underprovided, while that of the least productive
6A similar approach is used in Fernandez (2004) based on Wheaton (1977).
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region is overprovided. We also show that tax competition leads to a less than
efficient number of commuters. Interestingly, we show that the introduction
of a distortive wage tax tends to improve the provision of the public goods,
when compared to a situation where local governments only use a lump sum
residence tax. The use of the distortive wage tax is therefore, a second-
best result, as it partially offsets the distortion generated by the endogenous
spillover of the public goods.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we
present the model. Section 3 computes the first best, which is then used
as a benchmark to compare the results obtained in Section 4, i.e., the tax
competition equilibrium where both a lump sum and a distortive tax are
used. Section 5 compares the tax competition equilibrium found before with
the one attained when only the lump sum tax is used. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
We consider a linear city divided into two jurisdictions with the same size.
Each jurisdiction has an employment center where agents can work. The total
number of residents of the city is normalized to 1, as well as the city size,
with extreme points of the segment -1/2 and 1/2. Inhabitants are uniformly
distributed across the city and cannot choose their residence location. Each
agent is indexed by his residence place, x.
Let n(x) and N(x) denote the density and distribution function, respec-
tively, so that
n(x) = 1 and N(x) = x+ 1
2
Since the two jurisdictions have the same size and residents are uniformly
distributed, both have the same number of inhabitants, N̄ = 1/2. The
median resident of each jurisdiction coincides with the geographic center of
the jurisdiction, i.e., mH = −1/4 and mL = 1/4. The employment centers
are assumed to be symmetrically located in γ and −γ and located outwards
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from the median resident (γ > 1/4). This opens up the possibility for a
majority of residents of one jurisdiction to commute to the other one.
Firms located at the employment centers produce an homogeneous good
according to a linear technology Yi = αiNi, where Yi is the output and Ni is
the number of workers in jurisdiction i.7 The two jurisdictions have unequal
productivities. We use H to denote the high-productivity jurisdiction and L
for the low-productivity one, with αH > αL.
H L
‐1/2 1/20EC H EC L
Figure 1: The City
The government of each jurisdiction collects a head tax (Ti) paid by all
its residents and, possibly, an ad-valorem source-based tax on wages (τi) paid
by all workers in the employment center of jurisdiction i to finance a public
good budget Gi.
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The local government budget constraint is therefore
Gi = TiN̄ + αiτiNi
where αi is the gross wage earned by workers in the employment center of
jurisdiction i and Ni is the number of workers in that jurisdiction.
Agents support a per-mile commuting cost c and can choose to which
employment center they want to commute (i.e., where they want to work).
Commuting to the jurisdiction where they do not live is, therefore, more
costly than commuting to the one where they live since the distance they
must travel is higher. Each individual provides one unit of labor and pays a
wage tax at the source so that the net wage earned by an individual working
7As stated in Peralta (2007) the assumption of a linear technology is not essential and
the obtained results would remain unchanged if we introduce perfectly mobile capital in
the model with a constant returns to scale production function.
8Note that in our setup the head tax Ti can be seen as land or residential property tax
with fixed house size; since residence place is not chosen by agents this is a lump-sum tax.
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in j is ωj = αj(1−τj). All agents have a revenue W from other sources which
is assumed to be high enough such that everyone can always pay his tax bill.
Agents get utility both from private consumption and from the public good.
We follow Peralta (2007) and Braid (2000) and assume a quasi-linear util-
ity function; however, differently from that author, we allow the individuals
to enjoy both the public goods of their residence and work places. The utility
enjoyed by individual x, who lives in i and works in j is given by:
uij(x; τ ;Gi;Gj) = ωj − Ti +W − c|x− ECj|+ (1− k)υ(Gi) + kυ(Gj) (1)
i, j = H,L
where ECj is the location of the employment center where the agent chooses
to work (γ or −γ), Gi is the public good provided in the jurisdiction where he
lives, Gj is the public good provided in the jurisdiction where he works and
υ(G) is an increasing concave function. In the subsequent we will assume
υ(G) =
√
G.9 The intensity of the spillover effect due to having individu-
als deriving utility from the public goods provided in both jurisdictions is
measured by the constant k, where 0 ≤ k ≤ 1. When k ≤ 1/2, Gi is more
important than Gj, i.e., agents care more for the public good provided in
the jurisdiction where they live than for the one provided in the jurisdiction
where they work.10
Again, notice that this is not the standard spillover effect we can find in
the literature. In our case agents only get utility from the public good pro-
vided in the other jurisdiction if they decide to work there, i.e., the spillover
is endogenous. When they decide the working location they are also choosing
the public good mix they want to consume.
9Though this assumption is not essential to obtain most of our results, it allows for
closed form expressions and more clear-cut conclusions.
10This is what is considered, for example, in Besley and Coate (2003) and would fit our
model since we argue that agents are able to get utility from a wider variety of public
goods provided in their residence place. However, the assumption of these boundaries for
k is not necessary to reach the results of this paper so we choose not to impose them and
leave the problem as general as possible.
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2.1 The choice of the workplace
An agent will work in the jurisdiction where he lives if uii(x; τ ;Gi;GH) −
uij(x; τ ;Gi;GL) ≥ 0 and will commute to the other jurisdiction otherwise.
Looking at this utility difference we can calculate the marginal interjuris-
dictional commuter, denoted x̂. From (1) we can see that the difference
between the utility obtained working in H and the one obtained by working
in L is:
uiH − uiL =

ωH − ωL + 2γc+ k
[√
GH −
√
GL
]
if x ≤ −γ
ωH − ωL + 2xc+ k
[√
GH −
√
GL
]
if −γ < x < γ
ωH − ωL − 2γc+ k
[√
GH −
√
GL
]
if x ≥ γ
If uiH(x; τ)− uiL(x; τ) is positive the agent chooses to work in H, other-
wise he chooses to work in L. Note that for |x| > γ the utility difference is
independent from x which means that if one agents that lives between the
employment center of a jurisdiction and its outer limit wants to commute to
the other one, every agent will want to do the same. We assume away such
non-interesting cases and focus on the situation where −γ < x̂ < γ. The
marginal ij-commuter x̂ will be the one indifferent between working in H or
L, therefore
x̂ =
ωH − ωL + k
[√
GH −
√
GL
]
2c
(2)
This marginal interjurisdictional commuter x̂ defines a commuting equi-
librium where all x < x̂ work in H and all x > x̂ work in L.
3 First Best
We now compute the utilitarian first best to use as a benchmark for the
tax competition equilibrium analysis, i.e., the decision of a benevolent social
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planner that chooses the wage taxes, the residence taxes, the level of public
good provided in each jurisdiction and allocates workers to an employment
center so that overall utility is maximized.
The planner thus faces an overall budget constraint such that the provi-
sion of public goods must be fully paid by the wage and head taxes, i.e.,
GH +GL = τHαH
(
N̄ + x̂
)
+ τLαL
(
N̄ − x̂
)
+ N̄ (TH + tL) (3)
The problem faced by the social planner is therefore
max
x̂,GH ,GL,τH ,τL,TH ,TL
U = UH + UL
s.t. GH +GL = τHαH
(
N̄ + x̂
)
+ τLαL
(
N̄ − x̂
)
+ N̄ (TH + tL)
where U is the overall utility of the population, equal to the sum of the utility
of all inhabitants of jurisdiction H (UH) and of all inhabitants of jurisdiction
L (UL). Note that it will never be optimal to have H-residents commuting
to L since their commuting cost will be higher than if they work in H and
their productivity will be lower. Therefore, we can only have L residents
commuting to H, i.e., x̂ ≥ 0, which allow us to calculate UH and UL as:
UH =
∫ 0
− 1
2
uHHdx (4)
UL =
∫ x̂
0
uLHdx+
∫ 1
2
x̂
uLLdx (5)
Denoting by Ci the total commuting costs of all the residents of jurisdic-
tion i, we have
CH = c
[∫ −γ
− 1
2
(−γ − x)dx+
∫ 0
−γ
(x+ γ)dx
]
= c
(
1
8
+ γ2 − γ
2
)
(6)
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CL = c
[∫ −x̂
0
(x+ γ)dx+
∫ γ
x̂
(γ − x)dx+
∫ 1
2
γ
(x− γ)dx
]
= CH+c
(
x̂2
)
(7)
where the last term in CL is the increase in commuting costs due to the
interjurisdictional commuters which must travel a longer distance.
Total utility in each jurisdiction is therefore given by:
UH = N̄
[
ωH − TH +W +
√
GH
]
− CH (8)
UL = N̄
[
ωL − TL +W +
√
GL
]
− CH + x̂ [ωH − ωL + k∆υ]− c
(
x̂2
)
(9)
where ∆υ =
√
GH−
√
GL and k∆υ is the impact on utility of the consumption
of the public good provided in jurisdiction H rather the one provided in L to
interjurisdictional commuters.
Note that the two last terms of UL are the gain to L of having interjuris-
dictional commuters. The novelty of our analysis is reflected on the term ∆υ
generated by the spillover effect of the public goods: agents near the border
of jurisdiction L now have two effects on utility when commuting to H: the
difference in wage and the difference in the level of public goods provided
(weighted by k since they always get utility (1−k) from GL, the public good
provided in the jurisdiction where they live).
Solving the social planner problem formalized previously we can easily see
that the planner is indifferent between using the wage or the head tax, since
he can allocate the workers to any of the employment centers. Therefore the
choice of τH , τL, TH and TL is irrelevant for our analysis. The only thing that
must be ensured is that the budget constraint is satisfied with these taxes.
We can then assume τi = 0 and finance the public goods exclusively with
the head (lump-sum) taxes. This has the merit of ensuring that we are not
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implicitly performing any type of interjurisdictional transfers.11
Solving the first order conditions of the problem we reach the first best
solution:
x̂o =
αH − αL
2c− k2
(10)
GoH =
(
1
4
+
k (αH − αL)
4c− 2k2
)2
(11)
GoL =
(
1
4
− k (αH − αL)
4c− 2k2
)2
(12)
The first order conditions can be found in the appendix and clearly show
that the optimal interjurisdictional commuter x̂o results from the trade-off
between commuting costs and productivity gains and the public good level.
Notice that given what we stated above, for this solution to make sense x̂o
must be positive so that we have some individuals commuting from L to H
and not the other way around. Therefore, 2c− k2 > 0, or k2 < 2c.
Regarding the local public goods, the first order conditions express the
Samuelson condition for the optimal provision of public goods. Since GH
provides k-weighted utility also to x̂ residents of L, the marginal benefit of
GH is higher than without the spillover while the inverse applies to GL. This
fact also results in a higher optimal level of local public good in H than in
L, as we can see comparing equations (11) and (12).
Looking at the impact of the intensity of the spillover effect, k, on the
first best solution we can see that it positively affects x̂o and GoH , but has a
negative impact on GoL.
12 The intuition is straight-forward: if the spillover is
higher, the interjurisdictional commuters enjoy higher utility from GH and
lower from GL. This results in lower optimal provision of the former and
higher optimal provision of the the latter, thus leading to an increase in the
11As pointed in Peralta (2007). Remember that the purpose of the calculation of the
first best is to use it as a benchmark to compare with the tax competition equilibrium and
so we want to keep it as neutral as possible.
12The partial derivatives can be found in the appendix.
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optimal number of commuters from L to H (i.e., higher x̂o).
4 Tax Competition Equilibrium
Having calculated the conditions that define the first best, we can now com-
pute the tax competition equilibrium and compare it to the utilitarian opti-
mum. In this section we will assume that a government elected by majority
rule in each jurisdiction decides the taxes and public goods levels. The elected
policy will then be the one preferred by the median voter of each jurisdiction
which in our model coincide with the median resident, i.e., mH = −1/4 and
mL = 1/4. Notice that all agents agree on the residence tax Ti and, there-
fore, we have the same median voter in all directions. We are thus facing an
unidimensional problem and can apply the median voter theorem.
Since we are looking at the tax competition equilibrium attained when
local governments can use both the residence (lump-sum) and the wage (dis-
tortive) tax, agents are now concerned with the net wage they earn in each
employment center rather than the gross wage dictated by their productivity.
This means that local governments, when deciding the wage tax level, face
a trade-off between financing the public good and changing the number of
interjurisdictional commuters due to the reduction of the net wage in the
jurisdiction.
Each local government maximizes the utility of the median voter sub-
ject to the commuting equilibrium x̂ and to the budget constraint of the
jurisdiction:
max
Gi,τi,Ti
umi
s.t. x̂ =
(1− τH)αH − (1− τL)αL + k∆υ
2c
Gi = N̄Ti + τiαiNi
Remember that Ni is the number of agents working in the employment
center of jurisdiction i so that NH =
1
2
+ x̂ and NL =
1
2
− x̂.
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For the utility of the median voter we must separate the case where he
commutes to the other jurisdiction from the case where he commutes to
the employment center of his own jurisdiction. For the median voter of H,
we prove that in this framework it is never the case that he commutes to
jurisdiction L.13 This is an expectable result: since both the gross wage and
the public good are lower in the latter, and the traveled distance is much
higher than if he decides to work in the employment center of H, it does
not pay to commute to L. However, for the median voter of L it can make
sense to commute to H thanks to the increase in productivity. Therefore, the
median voter of H enjoys an utility of:
umH = (1− τH)αH +W − TH − c
(
−1
4
+ γ
)
+
√
GH
For the median voter of L, his utility when he works in his own jurisdiction
is given by:
umL = (1− τL)αL +W − TL − c
(
γ − 1
4
)
+
√
GL
If he decides to work in H he will get utility both from GL (weighted by
1− k) and GH (weighted by k) and his utility is, therefore, given by:
umL = (1− τH)αH +W − TL − c
(
1
4
+ γ
)
+ (1− k)
√
GL + k
√
GH
4.1 Median voter of L works in L
Let us first assume that the median voter of L works in the employment
center of L, which happens when x̂ < 1/4. Solving the utility maximization
problem for mH and mL we have the equilibrium solution given by:
τ ∗H =
2c
αH(6c− k2)
(αH − αL)
13The proof can be found in the appendix.
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τ ∗L = −
2c
αL(6c− k2)
(αH − αL)
G∗H =
(
1
4
+
k(αH − αL)
12c− 2k2
)2
G∗L =
(
1
4
− k(αH − αL)
12c− 2k2
)2
x̂∗ =
αH − αL
6c− k2
The first order conditions on the local public goods express the usual
equality between marginal benefit and marginal cost, taking into account
the impact of the level of public good on the government budget due to
interjurisdictional commuters, whose choice of working place is driven by
local public good provision. This means that increasing the provision of
the public good increases the number of workers subject to the wage tax,
affecting the cost borne by the median voter.
The characterization of the tax competition equilibrium is provided in
the following proposition:
Proposition 1: In the tax competition equilibrium where both the residence
and the wage taxes are available and both median voters work in their own
jurisdictions:
(i) The wage is taxed in H and subsidized in L;
(ii) The local public good in jurisdiction H is underprovided while the one
in jurisdiction L is overprovided;
(iii) There is undercommuting of agents.
Proof. See appendix.
The result that region H taxes wages while region L subsidizes them is
also obtained by Peralta (2007): H residents are exporting part of their tax
16
burden to the interjurisdictional commuters from region L using the wage
tax and since the median voter of L works in L, he uses the head tax to
impose a higher tax burden to the interjurisdictional commuters, which will
not receive the wage subsidy. What we are seeing is a transfer of income
from the interjurisdictional commuters to everyone else.
As for the provision of public goods, agents in H have a marginal cost of
GH lower than those in L. Since both the median voters of H and L are ex-
porting part of the tax burden to the L interjurisdictional commuters we have
two effects: for H residents, GH is less expensive due to the tax export and
due to the fact that by increasing GH the number of such commuters increase,
which makes it even less expensive; for the median voter of L increasing GL
decreases the number of commuters, which increases the marginal cost.
Comparing the levels of public good provided in each jurisdiction with
the first-best solution, we reach an intuitive underprovision of the public
good of jurisdiction H and overprovision of the one of jurisdiction L. The
median voter of H does not take into account the spillover effect of the public
good provided in H on the L-residents that commute to his jurisdiction and,
therefore, considers a lower marginal benefit of GH when compared to the
first-best. This leads to a situation of underprovision of this public good.
Similarly, the median voter of L does not consider that a fringe x̂ of the
residents of L commute to H and, thus, get utility from GL weighted by k,
leading to overprovision of GL.
All these distortions lead to undercommuting. This is easily explained
by the fact that jurisdiction H is less attractive, while jurisdiction L is more
attractive than in the first best case. A lower net wage earned in the em-
ployment center of H (due to the positive wage tax τH) and a lower level of
GH make jurisdiction H not so appealing while the opposite happens for L
(with subsidized wages and higher provision of GL).
It is also interesting to look at the impact of the the intensity of the
spillover effect, k, on the equilibrium solution as we did for the first best,
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i.e., taking the partial derivatives of the equilibrium expressions.14 We find
that k has a positive impact on the local public good of H, on the number
of commuters (measured by x̂) and on the wage tax charged in H. The wage
tax and the local public good in L depend negatively on k. The intuition
for the wage taxes is based on the tax exporting idea: when k increases the
incentives to commute from L to H also increase and, therefore, both median
voters have more room to charge the interjurisdictional commuters. For the
remaining variables, the intuition is basically the same as in the first best
case.
Finally, we check that the equilibrium obtained respects the condition
x̂ < 1/4, i.e., the median voter of L works in L.
x̂∗ =
αH − αL
6c− k2
<
1
4
⇔ αH − αL <
6c− k2
4
⇔ k2 < 6c− 4(αH − αL)
Remember that we are also assuming that x̂ < γ, therefore we must also
ensure this condition is satisfied. However, γ ∈ (1/4; 1/2) and, therefore, the
combination of the two conditions is x̂ < 1/4. The plot below shows the
space of parameters for which this equilibrium exists.
k2
(αH − αL)
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
3
2c
6c
x̂∗ < 1
4
 	
 	
Figure 2: Space of parameters when median voter of L works in L
14The partial derivatives can be found in the appendix.
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4.2 Median voter of L works in H
We shall now analyse the Nash equilibrium where the median voter of L
works in the employment center of H, i.e., he ij-commutes. Note that the
problem for the median voter of H remains unchanged, and GH is implicitly
defined by (16). However, for mL his utility is now given by:
umL = (1− τH)αH +W − TL − c
(
1
4
+ γ
)
+ (1− k)
√
GL + k
√
GH
Recall that the difference to the previous case is that the median voter
of L gets (1 − k)-weighted utility from GL and k-weighted utility from GH ,
the public good provided where he works. Deriving the first order conditions
and solving all the equations we get the following equilibrium levels:15
τ ∗H =
2c (c+ αH − αL)
αH(6c− k2)
τ ∗L =
c (4c− k2 − 2(αH − αL))
αL(6c− k2)
G∗H =
(
1
4
+
ck + k(αH − αL)
12c− 2k2
)2
G∗L =
(
1
4
− ck + k(αH − αL)
12c− 2k2
)2
x̂∗ =
αH − αL + c
6c− k2
On the first order conditions we can notice that the marginal benefit of
GL for the median voter of L is weighted by (1 − k) instead of 1, since he
works in H and therefore gets k-weighted utility from GH . The expression
for the marginal cost is the same as before.
The next proposition characterizes the tax competition equilibrium:
15The full first order conditions can be found in the appendix.
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Proposition 2: In the tax competition equilibrium where both the residence
and the wage taxes are available and both median voters work in the high-
productivity jurisdiction:
(i) The wages are taxed in H and in L;
(ii) The public good in jurisdiction H is underprovided while the one in
jurisdiction L is overprovided;
(iii) There is undercommuting of agents.
Proof. See appendix.
In this situation no jurisdiction is willing to subsidize wages. The median
voter of L is not willing to subsidize the wage in L due to the fact that he is
not working in that jurisdiction. Since he is now one of the interjurisdictional
commuters he wants to use τL to finance the budget of L because he is not
subject to such tax.
As for the provision of public goods, the intuition is basically the same
as in the previous case, with the additional fact that on the choice of GL
the marginal benefit for mL is now smaller since it is weighted by (1 −
k). Nevertheless, we can still show that GH is underprovided, and GL is
overprovided.
Let us now analyse the impact of k on the equilibrium solution.16 We find
that k has a positive impact on the local public good of H, on the number
of commuters (measured by x̂) and on the wage tax charged in H. The wage
tax and the local public good in L depend negatively on k. The arguments
exposed on the previous sections apply to this case as well.
We must now check that the equilibrium obtained respects the condition
x̂ > 1/4, i.e., the median voter of L is an interjurisdictional commuter.
x̂∗ =
αH − αL + c
6c− k2
>
1
4
⇔ αH − αL + c >
6c− k2
4
⇔ k2 > 2c− 4(αH − αL)
We must also check that x̂ < γ, knowing that γ ∈ (1/4; 1/2):
16Once again the partial derivatives can be found in the appendix.
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x̂∗ =
αH − αL + c
6c− k2
< γ ⇔ αH−αL+c < γ(6c−k2)⇔ k2 < 6c−
c+ αH − αL
γ
The plots below show the space of parameters for which this equilibrium
exists considering the two extreme values of γ: 1/2 and 1/4.
k2
(αH − αL)
C
C
C
CC
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
2c
2c
4c
x̂∗ > 1
4
x̂∗ < γ
 
 	
k2
(αH − αL)
C
C
C
CC
1
2c
2c
x̂∗ > 1
4
x̂∗
<
γ
Figure 3: Figure 4:
Space of parameters if γ = 1
2
Space of parameters if γ = 1
4
Checking for the extreme value γ = 1/4 is useful to see how the space of
possibilities changes with γ: the area between the lines gets smaller until it
vanishes when γ = 1/4.
Notice that the condition ensuring the existence of the equilibrium of
the previous section was k2 < 6c − 4(αH − αL), which means that the two
conditions do not fully complement each other. Therefore, there can be space
for no equilibrium or multiple equilibria for some values of the parameters.
This fact can be clearly identified in the following plot.
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Figure 5: The two spaces of parameters
The space of parameters that allows for existence of an equilibrium where
the median voter of L is an interjurisdictional commuter is partially contained
within the one that allows for the existence of equilibrium with both median
voters working in their own jurisdiction. Therefore, in this area, we can find
both equilibria. Outside this range, no equilibrium exists.
5 Eliminating the Distortive Wage Tax
In this section we compare the tax competition equilibrium obtained when
local governments only use the lump-sum head tax to the one when both the
lump-sum head tax and the distortive wage tax are used.
Following the structure of the previous sections, we first focus on the case
where the median voter of L works in L. If only the head tax is used, the
equilibrium levels of local public goods will be given by:17
G∗∗H = G
∗∗
L =
(
1
4
)2
Comparing the two tax competition equilibria we achieve a second-best
result induced by the use of the distortive tax:
17The details are provided in the appendix.
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Proposition 3: When both median voters work in their own jurisdictions,
the use of the distortive tax enhances the provision of the public goods vis-a-
vis the case where only the lump-sum tax is used.
Proof. See appendix.
As a matter of fact, the proof shows that:
GoH > G
∗
H > G
∗∗
H
GoL < G
∗
L < G
∗∗
L
The distortion introduced by the wage tax partially offsets the inefficiency
created by the tax competition equilibrium due to the spillover effect of the
public goods to the interjurisdictional commuters. This is a typical second-
best result where the introduction of two distortions (the wage tax and the
inter-jurisdictional externalities) improves upon the case where only one dis-
tortion is present. The tax export generated by the wage tax on H reduces
the marginal cost to the policy-maker in H, thus leading him to provide a
higher level of GH , thus getting closer to the optimal provision. The reverse
applies to L where the overprovision is reduced by the introduction of the
wage subsidy that increases the cost of provision to mL.
If we consider the case where the median voter of L commutes to H the
equilibrium levels of local public goods is:
G∗∗H =
(
1
4
)2
G∗∗L =
(
1
4
− k
4
)2
The result achieved in this case is not so strong as before:
Proposition 4: When the median voter of H works in H while the median
voter of L is an interjurisdictional commuter, the use of the distortive tax
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increases the level of public goods provided in both jurisdictions vis-a-vis the
case where only the lump-sum tax is used.
Proof. See appendix.
We can only say that eliminating the distortive wage tax we get an in-
crease in the provision of both local public goods as the proof shows that:
GoH > G
∗
H > G
∗∗
H
G∗L > G
o
H > G
∗∗
L
Note that we can no longer say that the provision of both public goods is
enhanced with the introduction of the distortive wage tax. We can be sure
of such enhancement regarding GH , but when we look at GL what we find is
that it changes a situation of underprovision into one of overprovision.
6 Conclusion
This paper introduces commuting-related spillovers in a duo-centric linear
city where local governments provide public goods and agents choose in which
region they want to work. We assume agents get utility
√
Gi from the public
goods provided in the jurisdiction where they live and where they work, thus
generating an endogenous spillover effect. The utility derived from the public
good supplied in the residence jurisdiction is weighted by (1 − k) while the
one derived from the public good provided in the work place is weighted by
k.
We show that in the tax competition equilibrium the public goods pro-
vided in the most productive region is underprovided and the one provided
in the less productive region is overprovided. Furthermore, we showed that
the use of the distortive tax tends to be preferred to the single use of a lump
24
sum tax in terms of the provision of the public goods as it partially offsets
the distortion introduced by the endogenous spillover effect.
The two kinds of taxes used to finance the public goods (residence and
wage taxes) are currently used in real world countries, such as U.S. states
as referred in the introduction and their application is, therefore, reasonable
and feasible.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1.
(i) τ ∗H =
αH−αL+k[
√
G∗H−
√
G∗L]
3αH
Since αH > αL and G
∗
H > G
∗
L ⇒ τ ∗H > 0
τ ∗∗L =
−(αH−αL)−k[
√
G∗H−
√
G∗L]
3αL
Since αH > αL and G
∗
H > G
∗∗
L ⇒ τ ∗L < 0
(ii)
√
G∗H −
√
GoH =
1
4
+ k(αH−αL)
12c−2k2 −
1
4
− k(αH−αL)
4c−2k2 =
k(αH−αL)
12c−2k2 −
k(αH−αL)
4c−2k2
Since 12c− 2k2 > 4c− 2k2 ⇔
√
G∗H −
√
GoH < 0⇔ G∗H < GoH√
G∗L −
√
GoL =
1
4
− k(αH−αL)
12c−2k2 −
1
4
+ (αH−αL)
4c−2k2 = −
k(αH−αL)
12c−2k2 +
(αH−αL)
4c−2k2
Since 12c− 2k2 > 4c− 2k2 ⇔
√
G∗L −
√
GoL > 0⇔ G∗L > GoL
(iii) x̂∗ − x̂o = αH−αL
6c−k2 −
αH−αL
2c−k2
Since 6c− k2 > 2c− k2 ⇔ x̂∗ − x̂o < 0⇔ x̂∗ < x̂o

Proof of Proposition 2.
(i) τ ∗HαH =
c
3
+ 2c
(
x̂∗ − 1
6
)
Since x̂∗ ∈
(
1
4
; 1
2
)
⇒ τ ∗H > 0
τ ∗LαL =
2
3
c− 2c
(
x̂∗ − 1
6
)
Since x̂∗ ∈
(
1
4
; 1
2
)
⇒ τ ∗LαL ∈
(
0; 1
2
)
⇒ τ ∗L > 0
(ii) For GH please check the proof of proposition 1 as the problem is the
same.√
G∗L −
√
GoL =
1
4
− k
2
x̂∗ −
(
1
4
− k
2
x̂o
)
= k
2
x̂o − k
2
x̂∗
Since there is undercommuting, x̂∗ < x̂o ⇔
√
G∗L −
√
GoL > 0⇔
⇔ G∗L > GoL
(iii) x̂∗ − x̂o = αH−αL+c
6c−k2 −
αH−αL
2c−k2 =
2c−k2−4(αH−αL)
(6c−k2)(2c−k2)
Since k2 > 4(αH − αL) + 2c and both denominators were positive so
that x̂ > 0⇔ 2c− k2 − 4(αH − αL) < −8(αH − αL) < 0⇔ x̂∗ < x̂o

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Proof of Proposition 3.√
G∗∗H −
√
G∗H =
1
4
−
(
1
4
+ k
2
x̂∗
)
= −k
2
x̂∗ < 0⇔ G∗H > G∗∗H√
G∗∗L −
√
G∗L =
1
4
−
(
1
4
− k
2
x̂∗
)
= k
2
x̂∗ > 0⇔ G∗L < G∗∗L

Proof of Proposition 4.√
G∗∗H −
√
G∗H =
1
4
−
(
1
4
+ k
2
x̂∗
)
= −k
2
x̂∗ < 0⇔ G∗H > G∗∗H√
G∗∗L −
√
G∗L =
1
4
− k
4
−
(
1
4
− k
2
x̂∗
)
= k
4
(2x̂∗ − 1)
Since 2x̂∗ < 1⇒
√
G∗∗L −
√
G∗L < 0⇔ G∗L > G∗∗L√
G∗∗L −
√
GoL =
1
4
− k
4
−
(
1
4
− k
2
x̂o
)
= k
4
(2x̂o − 1)
Since 2x̂o < 1⇒
√
G∗∗L −
√
GoL < 0⇔ GoL > G∗∗L

FOC of the first best utility maximization problem in section 3.
∂()
∂x̂
= 0⇔ x̂o = αH−αL+k[
√
GH−
√
GL]
2c
∂()
∂GH
= 0⇔ 1
2
√
GoH
(
1
2
+ x̂k
)
= 1
∂()
∂GL
= 0⇔ 1
2
√
GoL
(
1
2
− x̂k
)
= 1
Comparing the condition regarding x̂ with the one obtained in Peralta (2007)
we can see that the difference lies exactly on the presence of the term
k
[√
GH −
√
GL
]
. The spillover makes agents consider the difference in pub-
lic goods provision when deciding the work place since their utility depend
on Gj.
Partial derivatives in order to k of the first best solution
∂x̂o
∂k
= 2k(αH−αL)
(2c−k2)2 > 0
Since we only care for the sign of the derivatives, we can check the sign of
the partial derivative of
√
Gi instead of Gi:
∂
√
GoH
∂k
= 4k
2(αH−αL)
(4c−2k2)2 +
4k2(αH−αL)
(4c−2k2)2 > 0
∂
√
GoL
∂k
= − (αH−αL)4c
(4c−2k2)2 < 0
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Proof that there is no equilibrium with mH commuting to L
If mH commutes to L the maximization problems are to maximize:
umH = (1− τL)αL +W − TH − c
(
1
4
+ γ
)
+ (1− k)
√
GH + k
√
GL
and
umL = (1− τL)αL +W − TL − c
(
γ − 1
4
)
+
√
GL
The relevant first order conditions are, therefore,
∂UmH
∂GH
= 0⇔ −2
[
1− τHαH ∂x̂∂GH
]
+ 1−k
2
√
GH
= 0
∂UmH
∂τH
= 0⇔ αH
(
1
2
+ x̂
)
+ τHαH
∂x̂
∂τH
= 0
∂UmL
∂GL
= 0⇔ −2
[
1 + τLαL
∂x̂
∂GL
]
+ 1
2
√
GL
= 0
∂UmL
∂τL
= 0⇔ −αL + 2αL
(
1
2
− x̂
)
− 2τLαL ∂x̂∂τL = 0
Solving all the equations we reach the equilibrium marginal interjurisdic-
tional commuter:
x̂∗ = αH−αL−c
6c−k2
For mH to commute to L, x̂
∗ < −1
4
⇔ αH−αL−c
6c−k2 < −
1
4
⇔
⇔ αH − αL < −12c+
1
4
k2 ⇔ αH − αL < −14 (2c− k
2)
Since 2c− k2 > 0, the right hand side is negative, while the left hand side is
positive, which is impossible.
FOC of the utility maximization problems is section 4.1.
The equilibrium levels of local public goods are implicitly defined by:
∂UmH
∂GH
= 0⇔ 1
2
√
G∗H
= 2− τHαH kc
1
2
√
G∗H
∂UmL
∂GL
= 0⇔ 1
2
√
G∗L
= 2− τLαL kc
1
2
√
G∗L
Note that the marginal cost is affected by the term τiαi(k/c)υ
′(Gi), which is
the impact of the of the level of public good on the government budget due
to interjurisdictional commuters.
Regarding the wage taxes, the reaction functions are given by: ∂UmH
∂τH
= 0⇔
−αH − 2
[
−αH
(
1
2
+ x̂
)
+ τHαH
∂x̂
∂τH
]
= 0⇔
⇔ −αH − 2
[
−αH
(
1
2
+
(1−τH)αH−(1−τL)αL+k[
√
G∗H−
√
G∗L]
2c
+
τHα
2
H
2c
)]
= 0⇔
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⇔ τ ∗H =
αH−(1−τL)αL+k[
√
G∗H−
√
G∗L]
2αH
∂UmL
∂τL
= 0⇔ −αL − 2
[
−αL
(
1
2
− x̂
)
− τLαL ∂x̂∂τL
]
= 0⇔
⇔ −αL − 2
[
−αL
(
1
2
− (1−τH)αH−(1−τL)αL+k[
√
G∗H−
√
G∗L]
2c
)
− τLα
2
L
2c
]
= 0⇔
⇔ τ ∗L =
αL−(1−τH)αH+k[
√
G∗H−
√
G∗L]
2αL
Combining the two reaction functions on the wage taxes we get:
τ ∗H =
αH−αL+k[
√
G∗H−
√
G∗L]
3αH
τ ∗L =
−(αH−αL)−k[
√
G∗H−
√
G∗L]
3αL
These equations result on the equilibrium marginal interjurisdictional com-
muter:
x̂∗ =
αH−αL+k[
√
G∗H−
√
G∗L]
6c
Partial derivatives in order to k of the equilibrium in section 4.1.
∂x̂∗
∂k
= 2k(αH−αL)
(6c−k2)2 > 0
∂τ∗H
∂k
= 4kc(αH−αL)
αH(6c−k2)2
> 0
∂τ∗L
∂k
= −4kc(αH−αL)
αL(6c−k2)2
< 0
Since we only care for the sign of the derivatives, we can check the sign of
the partial derivative of
√
Gi instead of Gi:
∂
√
G∗H
∂k
= 4k
2(αH−αL)
(12c−2k2)2 > 0
∂
√
G∗L
∂k
= −4k
2(αH−αL)
(12c−2k2)2 < 0
FOC of the utility maximization problems in section 4.2.
The FOC on UmH are the same as in section 4.1.
1
2
√
GH
= 2c
τHαHk+c
τ ∗H =
αH−(1−τL)αL+k[
√
G∗H−
√
G∗L]
2αH
For umL we have:
∂UmL
∂GL
= 0⇔ (1− k) 1
2
√
GL
= 2− τLαL kc
1
2
√
GL
∂UmL
∂τL
= 0⇔ 2
[
αL
(
1
2
− x̂
)
+ τLαL
∂x̂
∂τL
]
= 0⇔
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⇔ 2
[
αL
(
1
2
− (1−τH)αH−(1−τL)αL+k[
√
G∗H−
√
G∗L]
2c
)
+
τLα
2
L
2c
]
= 0⇔
⇔ τ ∗L =
c+αL−(1−τH)αH−k[
√
G∗H−
√
G∗L]
2αL
Combining the two reaction functions on the wage tax we get:
τ ∗H =
c+(αH−αL)+k[
√
G∗H−
√
G∗L]
3αH
τ ∗L =
2c−(αH−αL)−k[
√
G∗H−
√
G∗L]
3αL
These equations result on the equilibrium marginal interjurisdictional com-
muter:
x̂∗ =
αH−αL+k[
√
GH−
√
GL]
6c
+ 1
6
Partial derivatives in order to k of the equilibrium in section 4.2.
∂x̂∗
∂k
= 2k(αH−αL+c)
(6c−k2)2 > 0
∂τ∗H
∂k
= 4kc(αH−αL+c)
αH(6c−k2)2
> 0
∂τ∗L
∂k
= −2kc(6c−k
2)+2k(4c−ck2−(αH−αL)
αL(6c−k2)2
< 0
Since we only care for the sign of the derivatives, we can check the sign of
the partial derivative of
√
Gi instead of Gi:
∂
√
G∗H
∂k
= c+(αH−αL)(12c−2k
2)+4k(ck+k(αH−αL))
(12c−2k2)2 > 0
∂
√
G∗L
∂k
= − c+(αH−αL)(12c−2k
2)+4k(ck+k(αH−αL))
(12c−2k2)2 < 0
FOC of the utility maximization problems in section 5.
The median voter of H enjoys an utility of:
umH = αH +W − TH − c
(
−1
4
+ γ
)
+
√
GH
If the median voter of L works in L his utility is given by:
umL = αL +W − TL − c
(
γ − 1
4
)
+
√
GL
The first order conditions are therefore:
∂umH
∂GH
= 0⇔ 1
2
√
G∗∗H
= 2⇔
√
G∗H =
1
4
∂umL
∂GL
= 0⇔ 1
2
√
G∗∗L
= 2⇔
√
G∗H =
1
4
If the median voter of L works is an interjurisdictional commuter, his utility
is given by:
umL = αH +W − TL − c
(
1
4
+ γ
)
+ (1− k)
√
GL + k
√
GH
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The first order conditions are therefore:
∂umH
∂GH
= 0⇔ 1
2
√
G∗∗H
= 2⇔
√
G∗H =
1
4
∂umL
∂GL
= 0⇔ 1−k
2
√
G∗∗L
= 2⇔
√
G∗L =
1−k
4
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